Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson ()
Additional contact information
Lars-Gunnar Svensson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden, http://www.nek.lu.se/en/contact

No 2012:8, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules which are least manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find an envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

Keywords: (Least) Manipulability; Envy-freeness; Budget-Balance; Indivisibilities. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2012-04-25, Revised 2013-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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Published as Andersson, Tommy, Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 'Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities' in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, pages 43-49.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities (2014)
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