Bidding Rings: A Bargaining Approach

Kalyan Chatterjee (), Manipushpak Mitra and Conan Mukherjee ()
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Kalyan Chatterjee: Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University

No 2015:1, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We address this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition structure can only be an order preserving r-ring, that includes the winner and the top (r-1) losers. In the multiple units case, we specify sufficient conditions for formation of an interesting class of equilibrium coalition structures, which we call single winner ring with free riding, where exactly one winner colludes with all the losers and generates maximum possible bidders' surplus, and, depending on the protocol, the remaining winners free ride either by staying alone or by colluding in pairs.

Keywords: Bidding rings; Bargaining games; Coalition formation; Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 D44 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2015-01-16, Revised 2016-01-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations:

Forthcoming as Chatterjee, Kalyan, Manipushpak Mitra and Conan Mukherjee, 'Bidding Rings: A Bargaining Approach' in Games and Economic Behavior.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bidding rings: A bargaining approach (2017)
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