Put a Bet on It: Can Self-Funded Commitment Contracts Curb Fitness Procrastination?

Devon Spika (), Linnea Wickström Östervall, Ulf-G. Gerdtham and Erik Wengström
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Devon Spika: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: School of Economics and Management, Box 7080, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden, https://www.devonspika.com/

No 2023:4, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the use of self-funded commitment contracts to support individuals in achieving their goals of increased physical activity. We compare the effect of soft (non-incentivised) commitment contracts with hard (incentivised) contracts using a randomised experiment with 1629 members of a large gym in Stockholm, Sweden. We find a significant positive impact of being offered a hard contract on monthly visits to the gym and the probability of meeting one's contract goal. Hard and soft commitment contracts increase gym visits by 21% and 8%, respectively, relative to the control group. Trait self-control is negatively associated with the likelihood of accepting a contract and accepting to add stakes. The effect of soft and hard commitment contracts does not, however, differ by trait self-control. Importantly, we find that the effects of both hard and soft contracts were greatest among participants who reported exercising the least at baseline. Our experiment explores the use of a completely self-funded and highly scalable intervention. Our experimental design allows us to shed light on the importance of hard penalties in designing commitment contracts.

Keywords: Incentives; Commitment contract; Self-control; Gym attendance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D03 I12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 82 pages
Date: 2023-04-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hea
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2023_004

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