All-pay auctions with affiliated values

Chang Koo Chi, Pauli Murto () and Juuso Välimäki
Additional contact information
Pauli Murto: Aalto University School of Business, Postal: Aalto, Finland

No 13/2017, Discussion Paper Series in Economics from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes all-pay auctions where the bidders have affiliated values for the object for sale and where the signals take binary values. Since signals are correlated, high signals indicate a high degree of competition in the auction and since even losing bidders must pay their bid, non-monotonic equilibria arise. We show that the game has a unique symmetric equilibrium, and that whenever the equilibrium is non-monotonic the contestants earn no rents. All-pay auctions result in low expected rents to the bidders, but also induce inefficient allocations in models with affiliated private values. With two bidders, the effect on rent extraction dominates, and all-pay auction outperforms standard auctions in terms of expected revenue. With many bidders, this revenue ranking is reversed for some parameter values and the inefficient allocations persist even in large auctions.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; common values; affiliated signals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2017-06-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: This is DP No 13/2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/2451926 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Values (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2017_013

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series in Economics from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics NHH, Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Synne Stormoen ().