On Revenue and Welfare Dominance of Ad Valorem Taxes in Two-Sided Markets

Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup

No 2009/9, Discussion Papers from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science

Abstract: A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.

Keywords: Ad Valorem Taxes; Unit Taxes; Two-Sided Markets; Revenue-Dominance; Welfare-Dominance; Monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 H20 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2009-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Journal Article: On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets (2009)
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