Irrigation Water Scarcity and Antisocial Behavior: Experimental Evidence from Communal Irrigation Water

Kidanemariam Abreha Gebretsadik ()
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Kidanemariam Abreha Gebretsadik: School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Postal: Norwegian University of Life Sciences, School of Economics and Business, P.O. Box 5003 NMBU, N-1432 Ås, Norway

No 5-2019, Working Paper Series from Norwegian University of Life Sciences, School of Economics and Business

Abstract: There are debates about climate-led resource scarcity and users’ behavior. Common pool resources (CPRs) are of particular interest in this regard as climate change may increase existing challenges. One reason for this is that CPR users may change their behavior in ways that affect other users. This paper looks at communal irrigation as a CPR in Ethiopia, where reduced availability of water may lead to unfair water allocations. Unfairness could lead to envy, which may pose extra problems for sustainable water management. I therefore conducted a joy-of-destruction game involving 192 randomly selected household heads (players) that mimic burning of another’s possession. Using a random draw, players were grouped into either the scarce water condition or abundant water condition. Within each group I randomly paired two players to play the game. This hypothetical game asks if the player in the group is willing to damage the other group’s irrigation field to maximize his/her own benefit. Both descriptive and econometrics methods of analysis were employed. Surprisingly, I found that players display less envious behavior when there is water scarcity than abundance. This is an astounding result and the possible explanation could be that the participating farmers in the experiment were not fully detached from their real-life perceptions. Both variables, water condition and amount of deduction, significantly influence the players’ decisions. The paper has implications on possible interventions of CPRs management, and suggests the need for further work on methodological aspects to enhance external validity in field games.

Keywords: Climate; Scarcity; Common Pool Resources; Irrigation Water; Envy; Joy-of-Destruction; Tigray; Ethiopia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 C93 D91 Q25 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2019-11-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:nlsseb:2019_005

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