Moving between Welfare Payments. The Case of Sickness Insurance for the Unemployed

Morten Henningsen ()
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Morten Henningsen: The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Postal: Gaustadalléen 21, N-0349 Oslo, Norway

No 04/2006, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This study describes the probability of transition from unemployment with unemployment insurance (UI) to sickness with sickness insurance (SI), using a grouped proportional hazard duration model and 9 years of monthly panel data. The combination of duration-limited UI and the fact that SI rights do not depend on remaining UI, creates an incentive to apply for SI, which is strongest immediately before UI expires. Estimation shows that the sickness hazard increases by around 50% when UI is about to end. Data on the sickness spells reveal that those who were given SI shortly before UI expired, are more likely to fully exploit the maximum of 12 months SI.

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; sickness insurance; unemployment duration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C41 I18 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2006-03-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:2006_004

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