Self-serving Dictators

Geir Asheim, Leif Helland, Jon Hovi () and Bjorn Hoyland ()
Additional contact information
Jon Hovi: Department of Political Science, Postal: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1097 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Bjorn Hoyland: Department of Political Science, Postal: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1097 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo,

No 26/2008, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide experimental evidence of self-serving fairness ideals in a dictator game design that includes treatments where funds can be transferred in two ways to the one player and in one way to the other. Two methods for transferring funds to the recipient produce the same results as the regular dictator game. However, two methods for transferring funds to the dictator reduce her generosity significantly. Hence, the fairness ideal adopted by dictators appears to be equal share per individual in the former case (as in the regular dictator game), and equal share per transfer method in the latter case.

Keywords: Self-serving Bias; Experimental Economics; Dictator Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2008-10-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:2008_026

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