Playing with the Good Guys: A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation

Kjell Arne Brekke, Karen Hauge, Jo Lind and Karine Nyborg

No 08/2009, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start o high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will selfselect into groups committed to charitable giving. Testing this experimentally, we let subjects choose between two group types, where one type donate a xed amount to a charity. Contributions in these groups stayed high, whereas contributions in the other groups showed the well known declining pattern. One implication is that corporate social responsibility may attract more responsible employees.

Keywords: Altruism; conditional cooperation; self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D12 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2009-04-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Brekke, Kjell Arne, Karen Evely Hauge, Jo Thori Lind and Karine Nyborg, 'Playing with the Good Guys: A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation' in Journal of Public Economics, 2011, pages 1111-1118.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation (2011)
Journal Article: Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation (2011)
Working Paper: Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:2009_008

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