Skewed Norms under Peer Pressure: Formation and Collapse

Moti Michaeli and Daniel Spiro

No 15/2014, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper shows that peer pressure may lead to dynamic convergence to a norm that is skewed with respect to preferences in society, yet is endogenously upheld by the population. Moreover, a skewed norm will often be more sustainable than a representative norm. This may explain the skewness of various social and religious norms. By furthermore interpreting a norm as a political regime, we show that biased regimes can be sustained even without the existence of a powerful group with coherent interests. We analyze the pattern by which political regimes collapse and relate it to contemporary revolutions and mass protests.

Keywords: Peer pressure; Social norm; Revolution; Protest movement; Alienation; Religion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D03 D72 D74 Z10 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2014-06-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:2014_015

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