Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing

Michael Hoel () and Tor Iversen

No 1999:1, HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme

Abstract: Privacy of information is a central concern in the debate about genetic testing. Two types of social inefficiencies may occur when information about prevention and test status is private; genetic testing may not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be done although it is socially inefficient. The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for consumers with public insurance only, while the second type of inefficiency is likely for those with a mix of public/private insurance. This second type of inefficiency is shown to be more important the less effective prevention is.

Keywords: Health insurance; genetic testing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hea and nep-ias
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