Redistribution at the hospital

Anne Wenche Emblem ()
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Anne Wenche Emblem: Faculty of Economics and Social Science, Postal: Agder University, Servicebox 422, N-4604 Kristiansand, Norway

No 2002:4, HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme

Abstract: This paper studies redistribution by means of a public supply of medical treatment. We show that the government can redistribute income towards low-ability individuals in a world of asymmetric information by offering bundles of medical treatment and redistributive payment. If self-selection is a problem, then the separating scheme offers high-ability individuals complete treatment against a high payment, and low-ability individuals partial treatment against a low payment. In particular, the level of treatment offered low-ability individuals is distorted downwards.

Keywords: health; medical treatment; insurance; redistribution; self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 H42 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2009-06-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hea and nep-ias
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