Optimal Disease Eradication

Scott Barrett and Michael Hoel ()
Additional contact information
Scott Barrett: Johns Hopkins University, Postal: School of Advanced International Studies

No 2003:23, HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme

Abstract: Using a dynamic model of the control of an infectious disease, we derive the conditions under which eradication will be optimal. When eradication is feasible, the optimal program requires either a low vaccination rate or eradication. A high vaccination rate is never optimal. Under special conditions, the results are especially stark: the optimal policy is either not to vaccinate at all or to eradicate. Our analysis yields a cost-benefit rule for eradication, which we apply to the current initiative to eradicate polio.

Keywords: Eradication of infectious diseases; vaccination; control theory; cost-benefit analysis; poliomyelitis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 H41 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2009-06-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.hero.uio.no/publicat/2003/HERO2003_23.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal disease eradication (2007)
Working Paper: Optimal Disease Eradication (2004)
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