Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?

Sven-Olov Daunfeldt, Jörgen Hellström and Mats Landström
Additional contact information
Jörgen Hellström: Department of Economics, Umeå University
Mats Landström: Department of Economics, University of Gävle

No 143, Ratio Working Papers from The Ratio Institute

Abstract: This paper is a first empirical attempt to investigate why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to fine-tune the economy. A new data-set covering 132 countries, of which 89 countries had implemented such reforms, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country has been characterized by a high variability in historical inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD-countries.

Keywords: inflation; institutional reforms; monetary policy; time-inconsistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2009-10-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cwa, nep-his, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ratio.se/pdf/wp/sod_jh_ml_central_bank.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.ratio.se/pdf/wp/sod_jh_ml_central_bank.pdf [308 Permanent Redirect]--> https://www.ratio.se/pdf/wp/sod_jh_ml_central_bank.pdf [308 Permanent Redirect]--> https://ratio.se/pdf/wp/sod_jh_ml_central_bank.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms? (2013)
Working Paper: Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms? (2008)
Working Paper: Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms? (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0143

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Ratio Working Papers from The Ratio Institute The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin Korpi ().