One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence

Johan Eklund () and Thomas Poulsen ()
Additional contact information
Thomas Poulsen: Copenhagen Business School

No 162, Ratio Working Papers from The Ratio Institute

Abstract: Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control enhancing mechanisms; it could also be that some shareholders retain a large block in a one share-one vote structure. In this paper, we develop a methodology to disentangle disproportionality, which allows us to test the effect of deviations from one share-one vote more precisely. Our empirical findings add to the existing literature.

Keywords: Ownership structure; one share-one vote; proportionality; performance; entrenchment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010-12-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://ratio.se/app/uploads/2014/11/jee_tp_share-one_162.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://ratio.se/app/uploads/2014/11/jee_tp_share-one_162.pdf [308 Permanent Redirect]--> https://ratio.se/app/uploads/2014/11/jee_tp_share-one_162.pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0162

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Ratio Working Papers from The Ratio Institute The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin Korpi ().