Family Control and Executive Compensation

Johanna Palmberg

No 186, Ratio Working Papers from The Ratio Institute

Abstract: This paper examines the effect of family ownership and control on executive compensation in listed firms during the period 2003-2008. The descriptive statistics show that CEOs in non-family-controlled firms have a significantly higher share of variable compensation than CEOs in family-controlled firms, they also receive remuneration in stock options relatively more often. The econometric analysis shows that family control and ownership concentration reduce CEO compensation whereas multiple-class shares increase the level of compensation. In line with the findings of previous research, firm size and performance are positively related to CEO compensation.

Keywords: Corporate governance; executive compensation; family ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 L20 L21 L22 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2012-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-hme
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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