A Welfare Ranking of Two-Sided Market Regimes

Mats A. Bergman ()
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Mats A. Bergman: Department of Economics, Södertörn University College, Postal: SE-141 89 Huddinge, Sweden

No 185, Working Paper Series from Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden)

Abstract: Two-sided network effects in card payment systems are analysed under different market structures, e.g., competition, one-sided monopoly, bilateral monopoly and duopoly; with and without an interchange fee; for the so-called Baxter’s case of non-strategic merchants. A partial ranking of market structures according to their welfare effects is provided. Some support is found for the policy adopted by the EU Commission in the competition law case concerning Visa’s interchange fees.

Keywords: Two-sided markets; card payments; payment systems; acquiring; issuing; market structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 L11 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2005-06-01, Revised 2005-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-fin and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0185

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