The Role of Money in Monetary Policy at the Lower Bound
Roberto Billi,
Ulf Söderström () and
Carl Walsh
No 390, Working Paper Series from Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden)
Abstract:
In light of the current low-interest-rate environment, we reconsider the merit of a money growth target (MGT) relative to a conventional ination targeting (IT) regime, and to the notion of price level targeting (PLT). Through the lens of a New Keynesian model, and accounting for a zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate, we show, not surprisingly, that PLT performs best in terms of social welfare. However, the ranking between IT and MGT is not a foregone conclusion. In particular, although MGT makes monetary policy vulnerable to money demand shocks, it contributes to achieving price level stability and reduces the incidence and severity of the ZLB relative to both IT and PLT. We also show that MGT lessens the need for the scal authority to engage alongside the central bank in ghting recessions. To illustrate this scal bene t of MGT, we introduce a simple rule for the scal authority to raise government purchases when GDP falls below potential. If the government fails to make up for a substantial share of the shortfalls in GDP, then IT performs worse than MGT from the perspective of society.
Keywords: Friedmans k-percent rule; ZLB constraint; scal policy; automatic stabilizers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E31 E42 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2020-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Role of Money in Monetary Policy at the Lower Bound (2023) 
Working Paper: The Role of Money in Monetary Policy at the Lower Bound (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0390
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