On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games

Jean Derks, Hans Peters and Peter Sudhölter

No 4/2012, Discussion Papers on Economics from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with transferable utility. An efficient allocation is undominated if it cannot be improved, in a specific way, by sidepayments changing the allocation or the game. The set of all such allocations is called the undominated set, and we show that it consists of finitely many polytopes with a core-like structure. One of these polytopes is the L1-center, consisting of all efficient allocations that minimize the sum of the absolute values of the excesses. The excess Pareto optimal set contains the allocations that are Pareto optimal in the set obtained by ordering the sums of the absolute values of the excesses of coalitions and the absolute values of the excesses of their complements. The L1-center is contained in the excess Pareto optimal set, which in turn is contained in the undominated set. For three-person games all these sets coincide. These three sets also coincide with the core for balanced games and with the anticore for antibalanced games. We study properties of these sets and provide characterizations in terms of balanced collections of coalitions. We also propose a single-valued selection from the excess Pareto optimal set, the min-prenucleolus, which is defined as the prenucleolus of the minimum of a game and its dual.

Keywords: Transferable utility game; core; anticore; core extension; min-prenucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2012-01-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.sdu.dk/-/media/files/om_sdu/institutte ... _2012/dpbe4_2012.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games (2014)
Working Paper: On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2012_004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers on Economics from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics Department of Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Astrid Holm Nielsen ().