Strategic Investment Dependence and Net Neutrality

Martin Nielsen ()
Additional contact information
Martin Nielsen: Department of Business and Economics, Postal: University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark

No 11/2015, Discussion Papers on Economics from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the way payments by content providers to an Internet service provider may affect investment in Internet speed and content quality. It derives payment mechanisms capable of aligning investment incentives between the two groups; in fact, some of them are Pareto-improving also for consumers, who are willing to pay for quality of content. On the other hand, some parameter combinations may require public intervention for Pareto improvement to be attained.

Keywords: Internet regulation; Network neutrality; Investment incentives; Monopoly; Duopoly; Regulation; Internet content; Netflix; Internet service providers; AT&T; Verizon; Comcast (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D42 D43 L12 L13 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2015-06-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ict, nep-net and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.sdu.dk/-/media/files/om_sdu/institutte ... 2015/dpbe11_2015.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2015_011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers on Economics from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics Department of Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Astrid Holm Nielsen ().