Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games
Pedro Calleja,
Francesc Llerena and
Peter Sudhölter
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Pedro Calleja: Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial, Postal: Universitat de Barcelona-BEAT, Av. Diagonal, 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain
Francesc Llerena: Departament de Gestió d'Empreses, Postal: Universitat Rovira i Virgili-CREIP, Av. de la Universitat, 1, 43204 Reus, Spain,
No 4/2020, Discussion Papers on Economics from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing "poorest" by "poorer" allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, strengthening core selection into bilateral consistency à la Davis and Maschler, and Pareto optimality into individual rationality and bilateral consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell, we obtain alternative and stylized axiomatic approaches.
Keywords: Dutta-Rays egalitarian solution; axiomatizations; convex TU game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2020-04-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2020_004
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