Who to pay for performance? The choice of organisational level for hospital performance incentives

Søren Kristensen, Mickael Bech and Jørgen Lauridsen

No 2013:5, DaCHE discussion papers from University of Southern Denmark, Dache - Danish Centre for Health Economics

Abstract: When implementing a pay for performance (P4P) scheme, designers must decide to whom the nancial incentive for performance should be directed. This paper compares department level hospital reported performance on the Danish Case Management Scheme at hospitals that did and did not redistribute performance payments to the department level. Across a range of models we nd that hospital reported performance at departments that operate under a direct nancial incentive is about 5 percentage points higher than performance at departments at hospital where performance payments are not directly redistributed to the department level. This result is in line with the theoretical expectations but due to the non-experimental design of the study, our results only have a causal interpretation under certain assumptions discussed in the paper

Keywords: Pay for performance; P4P; Hospital incentives; Incentive design; Team production (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L23 M52 O18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2013-06-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.sdu.dk/-/media/files/om_sdu/centre/coh ... pers/2013/2013_5.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sduhec:2013_005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DaCHE discussion papers from University of Southern Denmark, Dache - Danish Centre for Health Economics DaCHE - Danish Centre for Health Economics, Institut for Sundhedstjenesteforskning, Syddansk Universitet, J.B. Winsløws Vej 9B, 2. sal, DK-5000 Odense, Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Volmar Skovsgaard ().