Does poaching distort training?

Espen Moen (espen.r.moen@bi.no) and Åsa Rosén

No 4/2002, Working Paper Series from Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research

Abstract: We analyse the efficiency of the labour market outcome in a competitive search equilibrium model with endogenous turnover and endogenous general human capital formation. We show that search frictions do not distort training decisions if firms and their employees are able to coordinate efficiently, for instance, by using long-term contracts. In the absence of efficient coordination devices there is too much turnover and too little investments in general training. Nonetheless, the number of training firms and the amount of training provided are constrained optimal, and training subsidies therefore reduce welfare.

Keywords: Matching; Training; Poaching; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J41 J63 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2002-06-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Poaching Distort Training? (2004)
Working Paper: Does Poaching Distort Training? (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sofiwp:2002_004

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