Capital Adequacy and Liquidity in Banking Dynamics: Theory and Regulatory Implications
Jin Cao () and
Loran Chollete ()
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Loran Chollete: UiS, Postal: University of Stavanger, NO-4036 Stavanger, Norway
No 2014/16, UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance from University of Stavanger
Abstract:
We present a framework for modelling optimum capital adequacy in a dynamic banking context. We combine the (static) capital adequacy framework of Repullo (2013) with a dynamic banking model similar to that of Corbae and D`Erasmo (2014), with the extra feature that the probability of systemic risk is endogenous. Unlike previous work, we examine frameworks to ameliorate bankruptcy using both capital adequacy and liquidity requirements. Since equity is costly, the social cost of regulation may be reduced if a regulatory capital requirement can be accompanied by other tools such as a liquidity buffer.
Keywords: Keywords: Bankruptcy; Capital Adequacy; Endogenous Systemic Risk; Liquidity Requirement; Regulation Costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2014-09-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-cfn, nep-mac and nep-rmg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:stavef:2014_016
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