Resource revenue management and wealth neutrality

Klaus Mohn

No 2015/2, UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance from University of Stavanger

Abstract: An important idea behind the Norwegian oil fund mechanism and the fiscal spending rule is to protect the non-oil economy from the adverse effects of excessive spending of resource revenues over the Government budget. A critical assumption in this respect is that public sector saving is not being offset by private sector dis-saving, which is at stake with the hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence. Based on a framework of co-integrating saving rates, this model provides an empirical test of the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis on Norwegian time series data. Although the model rejects the strong-form presence of Ricardian equivalence, results indicate that the Norwegian approach does not fully succeed in separating spending of resource revenues from the accrual of the same revenues.

Keywords: Resource wealth; saving; fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 E21 E61 Q33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2015-01-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-mac
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