How Do Drug Lords in Final Destination Countries Respond to Anti-Drug Policies?

Adam Jacobsson () and Alberto Naranjo

No 2004:13, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper models how drug lords in final destination countries respond to two types of government anti-drug policies: demand and supply oriented. Supply policies (crop eradication, interdiction, etcetera) are modeled in line with the previous literature, that is, they increase production costs. Demand policies (domestic law enforcement, demand reduction programs, etcetera) are modeled within a conflict framework with drug lords over the control of distribution channels for illegal drugs, which is novel. The model predicts drug use, price and indirectly drug related violent crime. These predictions appear to be consistent with the data.

Keywords: drug policy; conflict; violent crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2004-09-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www2.ne.su.se/paper/wp04_13.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2004_0013

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Jensen ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).