Two-sided network effects, bank interchange fees, and the allocation of fixed costs

Mats Bergman ()
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Mats Bergman: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

No 2005:1, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Two-sided network effects in card payment systems are analysed under different market structures, e.g., competition, one-sided monopoly, bilateral monopoly and duopoly; with and without an interchange fee; for the so-called Baxter case of non-strategic merchants. A partial ranking of market structures according to their welfare effects is provided. Fixed central (card) system costs are introduced and analysed under free entry and duopoly. It is shown that under free entry, a per-transaction distribution of fixed costs is preferrable to dividing the fixed cost in equal proportions between the paritcipants. Under duopoly, (and no entry) a fixed division of central costs will yield lower prices.

Keywords: Two-sided markets; card payentd; payment systems; acquiring; issuing; market structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 L11 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2005-01-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-fin and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2005_0001

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