The Becker Paradox and Type I vs. Type II Errors in the Economics of Crime

Mats Persson and Claes-Henric Siven ()
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Claes-Henric Siven: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden, http://people.su.se/~siven/

No 2006:1, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Two real-world observations are not easily replicated in models of crime. First, although capital punishment is optimal in Becker’s (1968) model, it is rarely observed in the real world. Second, criminal procedure and the evaluation of evidence vary across societies and historical periods, the standard of proof being sometimes very high and sometimes quite low. In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of judicial procedure allowing for innocent persons being convicted. We show that the median voter theorem applies to this model, making judicial procedure endogenous. So formulated, the model can replicate both empirical observations.

Keywords: Criminal law; Judicial error; Burden of proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2006-01-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www2.ne.su.se/paper/wp06_01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Becker Paradox and Type I vs. Type II Errors in the Economics of Crime (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2006_0001

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