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Effects of Redistribution Policies - Who Gains and Who Loses?

Camilo von Greiff ()
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Camilo von Greiff: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

No 2007:12, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper combines optimal taxation theory with human capital theory and develops a theoretical model with endogenous wages and education decision, in which redistributive policy experiments are carried out and assessed. It is argued that general equilibrium effects of labor income taxation on wages may counteract fiscal redistribution. It is also shown that education subsidies may only benefit skilled workers, suggesting that this subsidy can merely be viewed as a redistribution from unskilled to skilled individuals. Therefore, optimal policy involves a lump-sum education tax in the form of a negative education subsidy.

Keywords: Income Redistribution; Education Subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2007-06-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-edu and nep-lab
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