Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government

David Granlund ()
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David Granlund: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden

No 786, Umeå Economic Studies from Umeå University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters' interests, but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneficial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians also liable for decisions made by the other level of government. When the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other, there is no risk of this leading to Leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents.

Keywords: moral hazard; separation of powers; Stackelberg; transparency; voting theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H00 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2009-11-27, Revised 2010-06-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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