Rewards and Copyrights with Hidden Information

Klas Sandén (klas.sanden@vxu.se)
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Klas Sandén: Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), Postal: Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), Dept of Economics and Statistics, School of Management and Economics, Växjö University , SE 351 95 Växjö, Sweden

No 2009:4, CAFO Working Papers from Linnaeus University, Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics

Abstract: This paper makes a theoretical contribution by investigating how the optimal copyright legislation depend on hidden information. A mixed hidden action – hidden information model is used. The regulator neither observes the type of firm nor the quality choice of firms. The paper provides no evidence that hidden information can motivate a copyright legislation. In fact it shows that the optimal policy, with asymmetric information, is a reward system that is second best.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Copyright; Reward system; Legislation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2008-09-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-lab and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:vxcafo:2009_004

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