The Opec Boys and the political economy of smuggling in northern Uganda

Els Lecoutere and Kristof Titeca (kristof.titeca@ugent.be)
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Kristof Titeca: Ghent University

No 36, HiCN Working Papers from Households in Conflict Network

Abstract: In this article, we unearth the institution for enforcement of the agreement between the Opec Boys, fuel smugglers and ex-rebels, and a politician, who allows them to conduct illegal smuggling. Rather than the Opec Boys� threat of rebellion, their promise of political support and refraining from civil disorder matters to inflict cooperation. A repeated play mechanism where the players punish each other for defection but return to cooperation makes up the �rules of the game�. Uncovering this endogenously emerged institution for contract enforcement explicitly reveals the importance of political alliances in the second economy in a fragile state environment.

Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-dev
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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