The formality in property rights: determinant in the military strategy of armed actors

Andrea P. Vel�squez Guijo ()
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Andrea P. Vel�squez Guijo: Universidad de los Andes
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Andrea Velasquez

No 39, HiCN Working Papers from Households in Conflict Network

Abstract: The causes of internal conflicts are not easy to identify, and in order to understand its dynamics it is important to determine the factors that influence its persistence. The appropriation of economic resources has been identified as a cause of the conflict; however, asset appropriation may not be the main motivation for armed groups. On the contrary, it may be seen as a means of financing, which influences the conflict�s persistence. In Colombia, land appropriation has been a recurrent strategy for illegal armed groups in order to increase their territorial control and the institutional weakness when defining property rights may facilitate illegal appropriation of these assets. The hypothesis presented in this work is that the informality of property rights positively influences the armed groups� decision of attacking and, therefore, influences the conflict�s intensity. In order to prove this hypothesis, an econometric model is proposed, which explains the conflict�s intensity through economic, social and institutional indicators at a municipal level. The results suggest that with a greater formality in property rights, the conflict�s intensity decreases.

Keywords: Institutions; armed conflict; property rights; possession and use of land (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D74 O17 P14 P37 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2008-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
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