On Maximal Vector Spaces of Finite Non-Cooperative Games

Victoria Kreps ()
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Victoria Kreps: National Research University Higher School of Economics

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: We consider finite non-cooperative N person games with fixed numbers mi, i = 1, . . . , N , of pure strategies of player i. We propose the following question: is it possible to extend the vector space of finite non-cooperative m1 ? m2 ? . . . ? mN - games in mixed strategies such that all games of a broader vector space of non- cooperative N person games on the product of unit (mi ? 1)-dimensional simpleces have Nash equilibrium points? We get a necessary and sufficient condition for the negative answer. This condition consists of a relation between the numbers of pure strategies of the players. For two-person games the condition is that the numbers of pure strategies of the both players are equal

Keywords: Finite non-cooperative N person games; vector space; Nash equilibrium point; maximality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, September 2016, pages 1-11

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:150/ec/2016

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