An Informational Basis for Voting Rules

Alexander Karpov

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a novel combinatorial approach for voting rule analysis. Applying reversal symmetry, we introduce a new class of preference profiles and a new representation (bracelet representation). By applying an impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model for the case of three alternatives, we obtain precise theoretical values for the number of voting situations for the plurality rule, the run-off rule, the Kemeny rule, the Borda rule, and the scoring rules in the extreme case. From enumerative combinatorics, we obtain an information utilization index for these rules. The main results are obtained for the case of three alternative

Keywords: ANEC; IANC; plurality; run-off; Kemeny; Borda; scoring rules; reversal symmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, April 2018, pages 1-24

Downloads: (external link)
https://wp.hse.ru/data/2018/04/04/1164595187/188EC2018.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:188/ec/2018

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shamil Abdulaev () and Shamil Abdulaev ().