Collusion detection in procurement auctions

Ilya Morozov () and Elena Podkolzina

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: This paper proposes a method of bid-rigging detection, which allows us to reveal cartels in procurement auctions without any prior knowledge of the market structure. We apply it to data on highway construction procurements in one of the Russian regions and show that five suppliers demonstrated passive bidding behavior, which is consistent with the so called ‘rotating bidding’ scheme of collusion. The suggested methodology can be potentially used by both researchers and anti-trust agencies for cartel disclosure in various markets.

Keywords: Bid-rigging; Tacit collusion; Public procurement; Cartel; Open auction. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H57 L41 L92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, February 2013, pages 1-36

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:25/ec/2013

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