The punctuality stability of the Nash equilibrium: the advantage of a late player in potential and aggregative games

Vasily Gusev ()
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Vasily Gusev: National Research University Higher School of Economics

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: If all players in a game employ Nash-equilibrium strategies, then no single player benefits from changing their strategy alone. In real games however, some players may intentionally arrive late and get a payoff greater than at the equilibrium. To wit, it sometimes pays to wait for competitors to announce their prices and then set the price for one’s own product. The motivation for intentional tardiness is the advantage of making the last move. Can it be arranged so that no player arrives in the game late intentionally? Responding to this challenge, we suggest forming a punctually stable Nash-equilibrium strategy profile. In this study, we investigate whether such a strategy profile exists in potential, aggregative, and symmetric games. What is remarkable about this study is that in some game-theoretical settings all-player punctuality can be achieved without penalizing late arrivals.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; punctuality stability; potential games; aggregative games; symmetric games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-spo
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Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, April 2023, pages 1-32

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:261/ec/2023

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