BUYING LOYALTY OF VOTERS OR LOCAL ELITES? POLITICAL ALIGNMENT AND TRANSFERS TO PROVINCES IN TUTELARY REGIMES: THE CASE OF IRAN

Ilya Vaskin ()
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Ilya Vaskin: National Research University Higher School of Economics

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: The paper investigates the impact of an electoral support for president for short- and long-term transfers between national and provincial governments in tutelary regimes. The research uses the case of Iran; the database covers 330 observations for 30/31 provinces for 2005-2015. The results show that Iranian presidents target short-term transfers for disloyal provincial elites, while long-term transfers do not show political connection with voting patterns. The results also allow for assuming that the key factor for the logic of distribution is a political competition

Keywords: voting alignment; intergovernmental transfers; tutelary regime; regional elites; Iran (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H77 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Published in WP BRP Series: Political Science / PS, August 2020, pages 1-24

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:73/ps/2020

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