CAREER TRAJECTORIES OF REGIONAL OFFICIALS: RUSSIA AND CHINA BEFORE AND AFTER 2012

Thomas Remington (), Andrei Yakovlev (), Elena Ovchinnikova () and Alexander Chasovsky ()
Additional contact information
Thomas Remington: National Research University Higher School of Economics
Andrei Yakovlev: National Research University Higher School of Economics
Elena Ovchinnikova: National Research University Higher School of Economics
Alexander Chasovsky: National Research University Higher School of Economics

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: Authoritarian leaders rely on regional officials for both political support and the fulfillment of their policy objectives. Central leaders face trade-offs between using institutionalized rules for choosing regional officials such as regular rotation and performance incentives, and building a stable base of personal support from loyalists. This paper analyzes appointments of regional officials in Russia and China before and after 2012. We hypothesize that, as a consequence of the centralization and personalization of state power in both regimes over the past decade, Russia’s system for appointing regional officials has become somewhat more regularized while in China under Xi it has become somewhat less regularized. Our analysis uses a comprehensive original set of biographical data on all top regional officials from 2002 through 2019 in China and from 2000 through 2019 in Russia. We discern clear differences between the pre- and post-2012 period for China and less marked differences for pre- and post-2012 Russia

Keywords: bureaucracy under authoritarian government; regional officials; career mobility; Russia; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H83 P21 P27 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-cna and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in WP BRP Series: Political Science / PS, October 2020, pages 1-36

Downloads: (external link)
https://wp.hse.ru/data/2020/10/23/1373846743/74PS2020.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:74/ps/2020

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shamil Abdulaev () and Shamil Abdulaev ().