 Self-Covariant Solutions To Cooperative Games With Transferable UtilitiesHSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics Abstract: A weakening of covariance property for solutions of cooperative games with transferable utilities self-covariance is dened. Self-covariant solutions are positively homogenous and satisfy a "restricted"translation covariance such that feasible shifts are only the solution vectors themselves and their multipliers. A description of all nonempty, ecient, anonymous, self-covariant, and single-valued solution for the class of two-person TU games is given. Among them the solutions admitting consistent extensions in the DavisMaschler sense are found. They are the equal share solution, the standard solution, and the constrained egalitarian solution for superadditive twoperson games. Characterizations of consistent extensions (Thomson 1996) of these solutions to the class of all TU games are given. Keywords: cooperative game with transferable utilities; solution; self-covariance; consistent extensions; constrained egalitarianism. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, December 2014, pages 1-25 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:85/ec/2014 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics |
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