Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and a Possible Role for the WTO

Jee-Hyeong Park

No 19, CCES Discussion Paper Series from Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

JEL-codes: F02 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 66 pages
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-int
Note: First Draft: June 2004; Revised: February, 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:ccesdp:19

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