Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization

Michele Lombardi, Naoki Yoshihara () and 直毅 吉原

No 49, CCES Discussion Paper Series from Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

Keywords: Implementation; Nash equilibrium; social choice correspondences; partial honesty; Condition μ (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 4 pages
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/25796/070ccesDP_49.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2020)
Working Paper: Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2018)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2018)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2017)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2017)
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2013)
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2013)
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