Competition and Post-Transplant Outcomes in Cadaveric Liver Transplantation under the MELD Scoring System

Harry Paarsch, Alberto M. Segre, John P. Roberts and Jeffrey B. Halldorson

No 522, CIS Discussion paper series from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: Previous researchers have modelled the decision to accept a donor organ for transplantation as a Markov decision problem, the solution to which is often a control-limit optimal policy: accept any organ whose match quality exceeds some health-dependent threshold; otherwise, wait for another. When competing transplant centers vie for the same organs, the decision rule changes relative to no competition; the relative size of competing centers affects the decision rules as well. Using center-specific graft and patient survival-rate data for cadaveric adult livers in the United States, we have found empirical evidence supporting these predictions.

Keywords: liver transplantation; competition; optimal stopping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 I12 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-hea
Note: First Draft: 15 September 2010; this Draft: 5 July 2011.
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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/19287/pie_dp522.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Competition and Post-Transplant Outcomes in Cadaveric Liver Transplantation under the MELD Scoring System (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:cisdps:522

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