EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Gender Occupational Segregation in an Equilibrium Search Model

Emiko Usui and 恵美子 臼井

No 560, CIS Discussion paper series from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper develops an equilibrium search model to explain gender asymmetry in occupational distribution. Workers’ utility depends on salary and working hours, and women have a greater aversion to market hours than men. Simulations indicate that women crowd into shorter-hour, lower-paying jobs than men. If employers discriminate against women, offers are tailored more toward men’s preferences; employers require longer working hours, and fewer women work at these jobs. Similarly, if women have a disutility factor in their utility toward positions with a higher proportion of men, fewer women work at these jobs. In both cases, gender segregation is reinforced

Keywords: Equilibrium Search; Gender preferences; Employer discrimination; Employee discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J16 J64 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-dge and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/23106/cis_dp560.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:cisdps:560

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIS Discussion paper series from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:hit:cisdps:560