Protection of basic research and R&D incentives in an international setting

Reiko Aoki, 玲子 青木 and Tina Kao

No 563, CIS Discussion paper series from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: We look at cumulative innovations and the protection of basic research which does not carry stand-alone commercial values in an international setting. Due to the complementarity of the innovations, we ・d that for some parameter range, technology leading countries do not always prefer the strongest protection standard. On the other hand, technology lagging countries do not always prefer the weakest protection standard. Intellectual property rights may be an instrument to soften R&D competition in the development stage and may be used to coordinate R&D efforts. Our model suggests that there may be less disputes on intellectual property right standards among countries in industries characterised by sequential innovations.

Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/23164/cis_dp563.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:cisdps:563

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIS Discussion paper series from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library ().