Tax Policy under the “Generational Election System”

Takero Doi

No 633, CIS Discussion paper series from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This chapter investigates the effects of introducing the “generational election system” proposed by Ihori and Doi (1998). The generational election system (or the election district by generation) consists of election districts divided by not only region but also generation. In industrial countries, intergenerational conflicts of interest are large at present. In particular, the older generation has more political power because of aging and fewer children. In an electoral system that consists of election districts divided only by region, conflicts of interest among regions can be dealt with in the Congress, but intergenerational conflicts are buried in each district because the opinions of older people dominate those of younger people. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the effects of introducing the generational election system using an overlapping generations model. The results of the voting equilibrium show that the preferred policy of the younger generation can be better represented in the generational election system compared with the current majoritarian system. Furthermore, the selected policy does not depend on the turnout rate of the younger generation. These results suggest that introducing the generational election system benefits both the younger and future generations.

JEL-codes: D72 H20 H31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-pub
Note: January 24, 2014, Revised on May 28, 2014, This paper will be published in Toshihiro Ihori and Kimiko Terai eds., “The Political Economy of Fiscal Consolidation in Japan,” Springer. Please cite the published version of this paper as a reference.
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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/26853/cis_dp633.pdf

Related works:
Chapter: Tax Policy Under the “Generational Election System” (2015)
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