消費増税を望むのは誰か？, Does graying Japan choose the consumption tax increase for the fiscal consolidation?

諭 島澤, Manabu Shimasawa, 了一 難波, Ryoichi Nanba, 雅彦 堤, Masahiko Tsutsumi, 一正 小黒 and Kazumasa Oguro

No 670, CIS Discussion paper series from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: 本稿では、世代内の異質性を組み込んだ一般均衡型世代重複シミュレーションモデルを用いて、我が国財政の持続可能性を維持するために必要な財政再建について、消費増税か累進労働所得増税かという二択問題を想定し、効用基準と現行の投票制度を前提とした投票によって決定する場合の分析を行った。その結果、消費税増税への賛成者は、中年より若い世代の高所得層だけであり、財政当局が目論む財政再建策は実現不可能である。そこで、ベンサム型政府を想定し、財政再建開始年に生存するすべての国民の効用変化の総和を考慮した場合には、消費税が選択されると確認された。しかし、この結果は、もっぱら高所得層の利益のため他の所得階層に犠牲を強いるに等しい選択であり、公平性に適う選択であるかは疑問の余地が大きい。最後に、将来世代のなかでも、消費増税による財政再建のメリットが帰属する生年・所得階層を特定化するシミュレーションによれば、より高い所得階層に属する者ほど、また、より後に生まれる者ほど消費税の増税から得られる恩恵が大きいことが分かった。投票によっては、2137年生まれまでの将来世代を投票対象者に考慮しなければ消費増税による財政再建を実現できず、実質的に不可能であることが示された。, We calculate welfare changes to reveal Japan’s preferred tax hike option to achieve fiscal sustainability by an overlapping generation model with four types of households grouped by income levels based on the latest Japanese data. Households vote on preferred taxation, i.e. the consumption tax or the progressive income tax, according to respective welfare changes under the current election system. Following implications are delivered. First, the consumption tax option is chosen when voters consider temporary welfare changes alone, i.e. myopic, while the progressive income tax is chosen when voters consider life-long welfare changes, i.e. rational. Second, the consumption tax option is chosen under the Utilitarian-type government setting even when life-long welfare changes are considered. However, this choice results in net benefits among higher income households at the cost of lower income households, giving rise to worsening income distribution and unfairness. Third, the fiscal consolidation by the consumption tax option tends to bring net benefits to those with higher income, and to those born later. Finally, the government intention to raise the consumption tax further for fiscal consolidation will not be achieved by the current voting system with rational voters. To realize it through voting, it is necessary to give the right of voting to those who will be born before 2137.

Keywords: 少子高齢化; 財政再建; 消費税; シミュレーション分析; population aging; fiscal sustainability; consumption tax; simulation analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C68 E62 H30 H61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-mac
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:cisdps:670

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