On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts

Daisuke Hirata, 大祐 平田, Yusuke Kasuya and 祐介 糟谷

No 2016-13, Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

Keywords: matching with contracts; stability; strategy-proofness; uniqueness; efficiency; irrelevance of rejected contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: This Version: December, 2016
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Downloads: (external link)
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/28238/070econDP16-13.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts (2017)
Working Paper: On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:econdp:2016-13

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