Creditor-Focused Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan

Vikas Mehrotra, Dimitri van Schaik, Jaap Spronk and Onno Steenbeek

No 2009-01, CEI Working Paper Series from Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: Mergers in Japan have the dubious distinction of not creating wealth for shareholders of target firms, in sharp contrast to much of the rest of the world. Using a sample of 91 mergers from 1982 through 2003 we document several distinctive features of the merger market in Japan: mergers tend to be countercyclical and often orchestrated by a common main bank. Overall our results point to a market for corporate control that is distinctly less shareholder-focused than that in the U.S., and one where creditors play an important, perhaps dominant, role in corporate governance.

Keywords: Japanese mergers; Japanese corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn and nep-com
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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/29220/wp2009-1.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Creditor-Focused Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hitcei:2009-01

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