Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara ()

No 590, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments.

Keywords: Implementation; Nash equilibrium; social choice correspondences; partial honesty; Condition μ (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/25819/DP590.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2020)
Working Paper: Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2018)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2018)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2017)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2017)
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization (2013)
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:590

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